T he rail industry in North America has been regulated in one form or another since the turn of the 20th century. Many rail regulations applied directly to infrastructure decisions, including oversight regarding addition or removal of track. After the Second World War, U.S. and Canadian railways argued with governments that their railways were overbuilt relative to traffic and settlement patterns in much of the continent. Another pressing issue in the story of regulatory change was the desire of railways to compete with the growing trucking industry. Because of the growth of roads and trucking throughout the mid-20th century, railways sought ways to lower their operating costs to remain competitive.
In the early days of extensive railway development so-called branch lines laced much of North America off a main or trunk rail line. Although many branch lines were built to connect one railway to another, many others were built primarily to serve a particular business or com-
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Stephen M. Law Canada (SSHRC) . Nolan also acknowledges support from SSHRC. As usual, we retain final responsibility for any remaining errors. munity. The latter branch line most often terminates without connecting to anywhere else and can be costly to operate if traffic along the line decreases significantly. The renewed focus of railways toward reducing operating costs meant that new policies were necessary concerning rail-line abandonment of uneconomic branch lines.
In the United States, the Staggers Act of 1980 granted extensive rail-track abandonment freedoms. All U.S. railways consolidated their networks and attempted to reduce costs under this statute. Some argue that track abandonment freedoms are one major reason why the rail industry has become more productive since liberalization. However, because track abandonment is necessarily a decision with long-term consequences, others are critical of the scope and impact of abandonment, especially on rural regions. Differing opinions of U.S. rail liberalization and the impact of U.S. rail-line abandonment can be found in Gallamore (1999) and Larson and Spraggins (2000) . Without question, a significant amount of U.S. rail-line abandonment appears completed. Although in the United States the issue is relatively dormant, in Canada, abandonment is still a very controversial policy issue in need of further analysis.
Liberalization in the Canadian rail industry began in 1967; however, only the passage of the Canada Transportation Act (CTA) in 1987 finally gave the Canadian Class I railroads more (but not complete) freedom to abandon unprofitable branch lines to consolidate their network operations. Amendments to the Act in 1995 granted further abandonment freedoms, and since 1996, each Class I railway in Canada has pursued an increasingly aggressive policy of rail-line abandonment, often drawing public ire with the speed and finality of abandonment (Estey, 1998) . From 1990 to 2002, the total distance of abandoned rail track in Canada was about 6,000 miles, compared to the current total rail network of about 30,000 miles (Transport Canada, 2003) . As in the United States, the pace of abandonment has now slowed. From 1999 to the present, there have been significantly fewer rail-line abandonments than in the previous 5 years. The latest publicly available data indicates that railways discontinued or abandoned just fewer than 200 miles of track in 2002 (Transport Canada, 2003) .
Although Canadian rail-line abandonment policy remains controversial, it is worth noting that certain aspects of line abandonment in Canada are very costly to the railways. Railways need to offer public notice well in advance (3 years in most cases) for those branch lines under consideration for abandonment. If any public opposition arises during this time, the abandonment proposal is then subject to a public hearing process that assesses wider opinions about the impact of abandonment. And if the process gets this far, track and right-of-way slated for abandonment can be offered for sale at a net salvage value that must be jointly established between the regulator and the railway. In addition, the regulator may judge that a proposed branch-line abandonment may be grain dependent and thereby deters the movement of grain and grain products. Therefore, in the event a particular proposed abandonment falls into this category and the railway chooses to complete the abandonment process, then it must pay direct compensation costs to all municipalities and communities affected by the loss of rail service. 1 At present, the so-called grain-dependent branch-line abandonment fee is $10,000 per mile or roughly $6,000 per kilometer of abandoned rail line. Estey (1998) contains further details of the process.
There remain accusations in Canada that the railways hamper affected parties (such as shippers or municipalities) in the defense of their interests to refute or delay proposed line abandonment. The comprehensive 1998 Estey review of the Canadian rail industry made public some of the feelings held, especially in western Canada, that the railways were not following the spirit of the current line-abandonment regulations.
In the wake of that review, the most recent proposed amendments to Canadian transportation policy offer only minor changes to existing rail-abandonment policy (relevant to commuter services in urban areas) and are not relevant to freight services (Government of Canada, 2003) . Thus, in spite of considerable opposition to the current policy (e.g., Canadian Wheat Board, 1999;  or Chapter 13 in Government of Canada, 2001) , the Canadian Ministry of Transportation, through the Canadian Transportation Agency will leave the current abandonment provisions mostly unchanged. The lack of resolution on this controversial issue remains a significant policy problem. In this article, we argue that one problem with the current rail-abandonment policy process may be methodological in nature. We suggest an alternative financial evaluation method for assessing track-abandonment proposals, a method that should be acceptable to all parties in the abandonment debate. Improved techniques for financial decision making, known as real options, permit more recognition of the value of decision flexibility than those methods currently used by the Canadian regulatory agency. In fact, the use of real-options analysis to evaluate infrastructure divestment or abandonment decisions is relatively well established in the business literature (Mun, 2002) . What is novel is the potential application of the method to a relevant public policy issue.
On a practical level, real options have the potential to be especially useful for evaluating abandonment decisions. A real-options analysis explicitly internalizes the value of any potential future use of assets (financial or otherwise) and thus mitigates against the risk of making myopic financial decisions that would be costly to undo. Applying real options to railabandonment proposals ensures that the long-term potential of rail-track infrastructure is fully captured in the decision process. In this regard, real-options analysis better represents public and private interests on this issue.
In the following section, we briefly characterize the economics of rail-line abandonment. Next, we outline the current methodology (cost-benefit analysis or CBA) that the regulatorthe Canadian Transportation Agency-uses to evaluate the financial elements of rail-line abandonment proposals. Although CBA is an established decision management tool, the realoptions methodology improves on CBA in ways that the case study documents. To this end, we discuss and reexamine the details of an interesting and well-documented Canadian lineabandonment case from the 1990s. Given the cost of railway construction today, in many jurisdictions line abandonment is essentially a decision in perpetuity. The case study argues that by applying real-options modeling to the rail-abandonment framework, the decision process necessarily becomes more transparent and, consequently, less controversial.
Strategic Reasons for Abandonment
Firms might pursue rail-line abandonment for competitive, collusive, or strategic purposes. To the extent that rail abandonment further separates nodes of competing railways, there would be a strong private incentive to abandon track that connects competing lines. However, the loss of competition might well imply reduced total benefits (i.e., economic surplus) for the system as a whole, so that under some conditions network abandonment may have a much higher private than social value. Social value may be negative in cases of pursuing abandonment to establish disjoint monopoly regions or otherwise to diminish competition. The resultant service falls and prices are higher. 2 Connecting network nodes (in-filling) or maintaining track to retain the potential for in-filling reflects a competitive environment.
In many cases, disconnecting network nodes is simply a cost-cutting measure that leaves a firm in a more competitive position, able to reduce prices. Alternatively, disconnecting nodes via network abandonment may be a strategy to pursue and to reduce competition or to remove the threat of future competition. 3 Thus, there is a unilateral (or noncooperative) reason and a collusive (cooperative) reason for rail-line abandonment. The most appropriate of these reasons depends on the degree and nature of interactions between the existing firms. 4 As a result, the regulatory authority charged with overseeing the abandonment process needs to be sensitive to the impact of network abandonment on competitive outcomes.
EVALUATING RAIL-LINE ABANDONMENT PROPOSALS
The Canadian Transportation Agency requires an assessment of the financial methodology to evaluate rail-abandonment proposals. The decision criterion currently used in abandonment cases is standard financial cost-benefit analysis. Simply stated, if the abandoning railway can show that the total discounted value of the specified segment of rail track is negative (that the Law et al. / RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT POLICY 147 In this article, we argue that one problem with the current railabandonment policy process may be methodological in nature.
costs exceed the benefits) using CBA, then the regulator permits the process of abandonment to proceed. Given considerable controversy concerning what constitutes either a benefit or a cost flow (for instance, see "Millions at Stake," 1999), the use of basic CBA to assess abandonment proposals in Canada and the United States remains unquestioned.
Alternative financial evaluation models (real-options analysis) gained favor in the past few years because they improve on basic CBA by incorporating an explicit valuation of risk into the analysis of investment decisions (Trigeorgis, 1999) . In many jurisdictions, rail abandonment is effectively a decision that will last in perpetuity. It is our contention that applying a real-options modeling perspective to the rail-abandonment decision framework better enables regulators to incorporate any potential future uses of track scheduled for abandonment into their final regulatory evaluations.
To frame this perspective, in the next section we develop an illustrative counterfactual case study. We reassess a Canadian regulatory decision to permit abandonment of a segment of the Uxbridge Subdivision of rail track near the city of Toronto, Canada. Toronto has an extensive public transportation system, including major subway and commuter rail networks. 6 At the time of the decision, the Canadian National Railway (CN) owned the branch line connecting several communities to the greater Toronto area. The amount of track ultimately abandoned in this case was only 1.43 miles long; however, the removal of the branch segment effectively cut off these communities (including the towns of Lindsay and Stouffville) from direct rail access into the Toronto area.
Using the lens of real-options analysis, we examine the following issues concerning the case study:
1. Under what set of circumstances was the decision to allow CN to exercise its option to abandon the Uxbridge branch segment, and collect its salvage value, the correct decision? 2. Under what set of circumstances would it have been preferable to refuse CN the right to abandon the Uxbridge branch segment?
IMPLEMENTING A REAL-OPTIONS FRAMEWORK IN THE CONTEXT OF RAIL-LINE ABANDONMENT
The decision to abandon breaks down into a set of basic components. If the owning railway abandons the segment, then it no longer incurs annual maintenance costs and will sell the track components (land, materials) for salvage value. If the owning railway does not abandon the track, then it forgoes any salvage value, incurs the maintenance costs, and collects revenue from its own operations along the track. In addition, any third-party operators (e.g., a commuter rail operator) will provide the railway additional revenue through some sort of infrastructure toll or rail-access fee. This simulated lease situation is quite common in transactions between freight railways and passenger railways, including VIA in Canada and AMTRAK in the United States (Bonsor, 1995) .
Background details of the Uxbridge case merit review. The former line segment known as the Uxbridge Subdivision was just over 20 miles in length, located northeast of the city of Toronto. The Subdivision was originally built sometime before 1920 and was owned by the Grand Trunk Railway, a predecessor railway that became part of the CN system in 1923 (Canadian Transportation Agency, 1993a). After several years of declining use, in a 1990 application and subsequent decision, the Canadian Transportation Agency permitted Canadian National to abandon the majority of the Uxbridge Subdivision.
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CN was also ordered at that time to keep a small 1.43-mile segment operational because of the possibility that it could become economical because of existing rail connections to that portion of the line and local use (Canadian Transportation Agency, 1990). However, Canadian National soon after testified (as documented in Decision 299-R-1993) that from 1989 through 1991, no revenue freight traffic passed through the remaining 1.43-mile branch and that they wished to complete abandonment of the entire subdivision.
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The relatively few interested parties who formally testified on the merits of line maintenance evidences the lack of immediate interest in the small section under abandonment consideration to abandon in 1993. These included the township of Uxbridge, the town of Lindsay, and the municipality of York, along with two private companies (Canadian Transportation Agency, 1993a). More interesting, the two levels of government argued that given the track segment's location near a large metropolitan area, the line still had considerable potential for use by the Government of Ontario (GO) transit system as a commuter line connecting commuters from Lindsay (and beyond) to the expanding Toronto area. In fact, if this commuter rail had sufficient potential use and the revenue generated for CN was sufficiently high, CN should not have had a strong incentive to abandon the track segment.
Restated in the language of real-options theory, we say that CN owned a put option on this track; this put option would be in the money if the revenues associated with keeping the track open are sufficiently low. Several key factors influence the value of a call or put option, and one of these is the strike price of the option. For a put option, the option holder has the right to sell the asset for the strike price; other things equal, a higher strike price increases the value of a put option. In the case of an abandonment option for the railway (put option), the strike price is the salvage value collected if the option were exercised. The decision to exercise a put option is based on a comparison of the strike price of the option and the value of the asset underlying the option. The value of the underlying asset includes not only its selling price but also any cash flows associated with continued ownership. Any costs of holding or storing the asset mitigate revenues from ownership. So with rail-line abandonment options, if the revenue associated with keeping the track operational is sufficiently high vis-à-vis the salvage value, CN would not exercise its right to abandon and would keep the rail segment operational. The value of the underlying asset (i.e., the track maintained as a going concern) must increase to cover maintenance costs.
The second factor influencing the value of an option is the value of the underlying asset itself. Other things equal, the higher the value of the underlying, the less likely a put-option holder is to exercise. Obviously, the higher the revenue from keeping the rail segment open, the less likely CN is to abandon the line. Because the payoff from exercising a put option is finitely high (i.e., unlimited profit is not possible because the maximum payoff is reached when the price of the underlying is zero), early exercise of the option is entirely possible if the option is sufficiently deep in the money.
Suppose instead that we considered not the actual revenue at the time of the decision but the present value of the probable stream of future revenues. In Canada, confidentiality agreements bind passenger railways to keep the terms of their access confidential (G. Kolaitis, VIA Rail Canada, personal communication, October 24, 2002) . Even so, we use other sources of information and compute estimates of the potential access-fee revenues that CN could have collected from GO commuter traffic on the Uxbridge branch segment.
For the purposes of this assessment, we employ a well-established rail-access-fee methodology applied by Carlson and Nolan (2004) to the Canadian rail system. 8 In turn, computing the fee allows us to perform general sensitivity analyses to determine the desired level of traffic on the segment to cover CN's direct cost of maintaining the line. Table 1 contains these estimates. The data show that considerable commuter-rail service is necessary (12 trains; 6 morning and/ or 6 evening trains) to simply cover the maintenance costs of the subdivision. In addition, if it were possible to make a probability statement regarding the likelihood of the GO commuter traffic ever existing on this line, then we would be able to calculate the present value of the expected future revenues. However, that type of computation is beyond the scope of the current study.
We do know that, on average, flat fees can reasonably approximate access fees computed on a per-unit transported basis. In reality, rail-access fees for passenger-rail operators in Canada take a variety of forms (G. Kolaitis, VIA Rail Canada, personal communication, October 24, 2002) ; however, all are similar in spirit to the type computed in Table 1 . More important, Table 1 illustrates that there is likely only minimal variation in the access revenue under existing access- Law et al. / RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT POLICY 149 fee arrangements for the host railway if a commuter line materialized utilizing the subdivision track.
Examination of the nature of access fees for the use of track by passenger rail in Canada highlights the importance of the next factor affecting the value of options: the volatility of the price or return on the asset underlying the option. If there is a high degree of risk or uncertainty associated with the asset underlying the option, then the option is more valuable. Options give their holders the opportunity to reap profit from price movements in one particular direction. Put options provide basic insurance. The put-option holder reaps profit in the event of downward price movement in the underlying asset, that is, the holder has the right to sell the asset for a fixed price even though the actual market value of that asset is below that fixed price. Risk or uncertainty associated with future revenues from the Uxbridge branch segment makes the option to abandon the line potentially valuable to CN. The higher the degree of uncertainty, the more valuable is the option.
The real-options financial decision framework recognizes the value of the flexibility the financial manager and/or decision maker has in choosing whether to abandon the rail line, depending on the projected profitability of the line. In this case, a high degree of uncertainty about the future value of the rail line existed. Certainly some chance of a commuter line becoming desirable would have made exercising the put option unlikely. In addition, a chance the commuter line would never materialize persisted as did the line's current level of usage and associated revenue. The put option was likely to be exercised, and the line abandoned, if the latter scenario became the most probable.
The information contained in Decision No. 299-R-1993 implies that the revenue uncertainty for CN was resolved. CN perceived no possibility of a viable commuter line using the subdivision. In addition, no other source of revenue for CN was available on the line in the foreseeable future. The notion of flexibility in decision making has value given a high degree of uncertainty associated with future outcomes influencing the decision. This flexibility is analogous to increased volatility in the underlying asset increasing the value of an option.
The volatility or uncertainty associated with the revenues on the Uxbridge branch line relate to the probability of a connecting GO commuter line becoming a reality and to the revenue to CN associated with that commuter line. The probability of future revenue-generating traffic along this segment of track other than from commuter traffic is small. Otherwise, it is reasonable to suppose that CN would have referred to it in the decision and would not be so eager to abandon the segment. Flat or near-flat track access-fee structures do not translate into potentially volatile revenues. If the uncertainty associated with the revenue on this line were more variable, the option aspect of the abandonment would have more value.
The relevant uncertainty in this case asks whether the GO commuter line would ever materialize (along with any other new source of revenue). However, consider the following situation-if a passenger rail-access fee permitted variation with actual passenger traffic and not just on rail car movement, then a different outcome for the abandonment decision using an options framework might have materialized. For example, from 1997 to 1998 the average percentage increase in the number of passengers using all GO trains was 5.8%, from a high of 20% on the Bradford line down to 3.3% on the Lakeshore East line (Government of Ontario Transit, 1998) . This variation or volatility is an ideal framework in which to use a real-options approach to evaluate the potential abandonment decision. If the access fee computed for a GO commuter line were proportional to the number of passengers, it is clear that revenue variability would increase. In this case, the decision to abandon the line by CN would be more closely tied to the same factors that interest the proponents who campaigned to keep the line open. Time to maturity is the fourth factor influencing the value of an option. Other things being equal, the longer the time to maturity, the more valuable the option is. Intuitively in our context, the further into the future a definitive decision regarding abandonment must be taken, the more valuable the flexibility in that decision making will be. In the real-or financial-option context, time allows the option to move more fully in the money or more definitely out of the money. In context of the rail-abandonment decision, or any other real-option decision, a longer time horizon allows us to collect and analyze relevant facts and make a more informed decision.
The final factor is the existence of cash flows emanating from the underlying asset. 9 In the real-option case, an option written on an asset that entitles its owner to a stream of cash flows may alter the exercise decision depending on the magnitude and timing of the cash flows. The longer CN waited to make a decision regarding abandoning the Uxbridge branch line, the longer CN could collect any revenue generated from the operation of the track. The latter was not a consideration, given no actual revenue generated by the line and GO commuter traffic was the only potential source of revenue in the foreseeable future.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Suppose, as actually transpired, that CN was permitted to abandon the segment of track with the result that track and ties were removed and sold for salvage value. If a commuter line to Lindsay and other communities became desirable in the future, the cost associated with implementing such a line would inflate to include the reconstruction of the line. In addition to rebuilding the segment of track, GO or the relevant municipality (or some combination) would also have to repurchase the right-of-way. This burden would be true in virtually all such cases across Canada.
Government intervention via the existing legislation could encourage the use of appropriate financial arrangements when a municipality desires to purchase rail right-of-way but is uncertain about future use. In fact, such a policy would not be a large deviation from the present abandonment legislation allowing municipalities to purchase track outright from railways for the salvage value. In the case examined above, several municipalities were certainly interested in the future possibility of having a GO commuter line running to Toronto. In essence, this potential translates into the Canadian Transportation Agency permitting municipalities to purchase what looks like a call option on the relevant rail line to be abandoned, that is making a capital investment now that opens up the possibility or the right to make future investments if they turn out to be profitable decisions.
The price of the call option would necessarily be smaller than the salvage value and would entitle the municipality to sufficient time for a firm decision regarding outright purchase of the rail right-of-way. In this manner, the railway would obtain revenue in return for keeping the line operational until the expiration date of the municipality's option. Furthermore, a call option on the line would give interested parties in the municipality time to determine whether a commuter rail was really viable. For its part, CN would not be obliged to maintain the track segment beyond the maturity date of the municipality's option.
Without financial and/or real-option alternatives to evaluate the viability of abandoned lines, the willingness of governments to avoid future costs might induce them to pay more to a railway to maintain the original line rather than abandon it. The issue is especially relevant because the recent suggested changes to transportation legislation state explicitly that rail abandonment applicable to potential commuter transit lines should be given special consideration (Government of Canada, 2003) . A thorough analysis of an appropriate price to avoid abandonment would require information regarding the probability of alternative uses being created (i.e., a Law et al. / RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT POLICY 151 While our approach to abandonment decisions appears to be best suited to lines with potential passenger rail use, we know that much of the controversy in Canada surrounding rail abandonment relates to grain dependent branch lines.
commuter line), along with projections into the future on how long such activity would occur (i.e., how many years CN would be expected to maintain the track without any traffic along the line) and the cost of reconstructing the track.
Conclusions
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a well-established tool in the process of making infrastructure investment or divestment decisions. Real-options analysis takes into consideration critical elements in decision making that cannot be readily incorporated into traditional CBA, such as decision flexibility. In this research, we first establish that real options readily adapt for use in all rail-abandonment decisions. To illustrate this, we reassess a case study of line abandonment from Canada using the lens of real-options analysis. Ultimately, we find that depending on the computation of any potential rail-infrastructure access fees, the real-options approach yields a perspective and assessment that is of interest to both sides of the rail-abandonment debate in Canada and in other jurisdictions.
While our approach to abandonment decisions appears to be best suited to lines with potential passenger rail use, we know that much of the controversy in Canada surrounding rail abandonment relates to grain dependent branch lines. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether real options will eventually be considered as a regulatory instrument to help support abandonment decisions for predominantly freight rail lines. However, real options does tell us that if the variability of freight movement and revenues is high enough, then the suggested approach will prove to be valuable to a regulator in the decision-making process about infrastructure abandonment.
Notes
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether real options will eventually be considered as a regulatory instrument to help support abandonment decisions for predominantly freight rail lines.
